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ABSTRACT
MASS MOBILIZATION AND THE BREAKDOWN OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES:
EGYPT AND INDONESIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Testriono, M.A.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Kikue Hamayotsu, Director

Why do elite conflicts in new democratic countries produce divergent political outcomes?
Under what conditions do elite conflicts lead to the survival or the breakdown of democracy?
Previous studies emphasize structural, institutional, and elite factors in explaining democratic
breakdown, while overlooking popular mobilization as a factor. In proposing the interaction of
two variables, elite conflict and mass mobilization, this thesis argues the divergent levels of the
embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict during political crisis result in either the
survival or the breakdown of democratic regimes. I examine Egypt and Indonesia because they
underwent severe elite conflict but had different regime outcomes. Egypt is a case of a high-level
embeddedness of mass mobilization in an elite conflict during political crisis, which triggered a
military takeover and resulted in the breakdown of Egyptian democracy. In contrast, Indonesia is
a case of a low-level embeddedness of mass mobilization in an elite conflict during political
crisis, which resulted in the survival of Indonesian democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
Some studies “present fresh evidence; others make arguments that urge the reader to see
old problems in a new light” (Skocpol 1979, xi). This study, clearly passing through the latter
path, offers an analysis of political dynamics in new democratic countries during transitional
periods. Democratic transitions,1 a critical step following the breakdown of an authoritarian
regime, are marked by the handover of power to a new democratic government elected in a
founding election. However, unless the democracy has really been consolidated, the transitional
period is often uncertain and does not necessarily lead to democratic stability. The transitions to
democracy that took place in two Muslim-majority countries, Egypt and Indonesia, are examples
of crucial political processes that produced two different outcomes: democratic survival and
democratic breakdown.
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Indonesia underwent a major political
transition that started with the toppling of Soeharto’s 32-year-old authoritarian regime as a result
of the Reform Movement of 1998. The first democratic election in 1999 paved the way for the
rise of Abdurrahman Wahid, the former chairman of the prominent Islamic movement, Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), to become the first president elected during democratization. However, halfway
through his term in office, Wahid faced a series of interparty tensions that led the People’s

1

Scholars differentiate between “democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation”. O’Donnell and Schmitter
(1986) define the “transition” as “the interval between one political regime and another. … Transitions are
delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the
other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence
of a revolutionary alternative” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 6). Following O’Donnell and Schmitter, I argue, the
cases of democratic breakdown in Egypt (2013) and democratic survival in Indonesia (2001) occurred during the
period of democratic transition.
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Consultative Assembly (MPR) to remove him from office in 2001. Wahid was impeached, but
Indonesia’s democracy has survived. Similarly, during the so-called Arab Spring in 2011, a
transition to democracy took place in Egypt following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s 30year-old dictatorship. In the post-authoritarian parliamentary election of 2011, the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) gained a majority of the votes, leading to Mohamed Morsi’s June 2012
presidential election win. However, in July 2013, a year after the country’s democratic
presidential election, the military overthrew Morsi following contentious politics2 that occurred
in the country. In contrast to the Indonesian case, Egypt experienced a democratic breakdown.
This paper focuses on the causes of different regime outcomes during times of political
crisis in Egypt and Indonesia, by analyzing the causal mechanism of elite conflict under different
levels of mass mobilization. The questions that inspire this study arise from the dissimilar
experiences of the two countries during the beginning years of democratization, the so-called
“years of living dangerously” (Emmerson 2000). Why do elite conflicts in new democratic
countries produce divergent political outcomes? Under what conditions do elite conflicts lead to
the survival or the breakdown of democracy? During political crises in some new democratic
countries, why do some militaries tend to intervene in politics than others?
My central argument is as follows: divergent levels of the embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite competition during political crisis in the period of democratic transition
result in either the survival or the breakdown of democratic regimes. By political crisis, I refer to
2

Slater (2010) defines “contentious politics” as “nonroutine political events involving considerable popular
mobilization, contentious politics encompasses a wide range of transgressive, collective mass actions—from labor
strikes to ethnic riots, from rural rebellions to student protests, from urban terrorism to street barricades, and from
social revolutions to separatist insurgencies” (Slater 2010, 5).
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conflicts among political elites—which involve mass mobilization—over the allocation of
resources, policy disagreements, or the tensions triggered by the changes of elite coalitions in
supporting or opposing the incumbent governments (Linz 1978; O’Donnell 1978, 23). Linz
(1978) argues that political crisis is the result of a lack of efficacy or effectiveness3 of
governments when dealing with serious problems but failing to solve them, leading to the
breakdown of democratic regimes (Linz 1978, 50-55).
Certainly the problem of overthrowing democratic systems has long been a curiosity of
those who study democratization. Ulfelder reported that there were nearly 110 failures of
democracy that took place during the period 1955-2007 through four types of takeover: military
coup, executive coup, rebellion, and other (foreign forces intervention, dissolution or merger,
and dismissal by monarchs) (Ulfelder 2010, 59-60). Ample studies have been done to explain
such phenomena and offer a number of hypotheses. My study follows, in part, an extensive
literature that emphasizes what Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) call “concrete historic
actors.” This framework confirms that the survival or breakdown of democratic regimes relies on
“what political leaders, political parties, militaries, and other key actors do” (Mainwaring and
Pérez-Liñán, 2012).
During democratic transitions, factionalism among political elites is often rampant,
caused either by the choice of party system (especially multiparty one), or simply by the legacy
3

“Efficacy” refers to the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems faced by any political system
that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory by aware citizens. “Effectiveness” is the capacity actually
to implement the policies formulated, with the desired results. The problems become unsolvable under the following
circumstances: the alienation of the military leaders from the political leadership, the strong commitment of political
leaders to an ideology that weakens their commitment to a political system, a fragmented leadership, the limited
capacity of governments to handle problems and offering solutions (O’Donnell 1988, 21-22, 50-55).
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of the authoritarian regime. Therefore, opposition elites that are able to gain effective support
potentially take over power and create a new authoritarian regime (Linz 1978, 27-38). Similarly,
in many new democracies, the militaries are still dominant political powers and often position
themselves as political guardians of the civilian government, where they are ready to intervene
under certain circumstances (Hadenius 1992, 139; Stepan 1988). In this situation, elite conflicts
can trigger a military takeover.
However, the existing literature has a limitation in terms of locating mass mobilization as
a contributory factor in influencing the regime outcome. Opposition leaders need mass support to
press the incumbent government. At the same time, militaries could defend or destroy an
incumbent democratic government after considering the extent of popular pressure that arises
during a political crisis. The militaries will regard massive political mobilization as a “threat”4 to
social and political stability, a condition that may cause them to intervene in civilian politics.
Therefore, this study attempts to examine mass mobilization as an explanatory variable in the
analysis of democratic breakdown and include the intervention of military in politics as an
intervening variable of analysis.
Military interventions in politics have long been regarded as an obstacle for a democratic
consolidation. According to Diamond (1999), a challenge for many new democracies is to
diminish the autonomous and seemingly limitless power of the military, because “democracy
cannot be consolidated until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and
4

This concept of “threat” was introduced by O’Donnell (1978) who argued that the “threat” posed to dominant
elites (especially capitalists) by popular-sector mobilization was an important trigger of democratic breakdowns in
Latin America (cited from Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2013, 124).
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committed to the democratic constitutional order” (Diamond 1999, 113). Huntington (1968)
argues that the consequence of a military intervention in politics is that it contributes to an
erosion of political order (Huntington 1968). The two cases under this study, Egypt and
Indonesia, are former military authoritarian regimes (Loring 2014; Geddes 2014; Cook 2007)
where their militaries could intervene in civilian politics during a democratic transition.
However, the military takeover happened in Egypt and did not occur in Indonesia. Therefore,
rather regarding the military intervention in politics, a common threat to many new democratic
countries, as an explanatory variable, this study considers it as an intervening variable, which
mediates between the explanatory variable and the outcome.
This study makes three primary contributions. First, the study proposes a theory on
democratic breakdown arguing that the divergent levels of the embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite competition result in the different regime outcomes. Second, this study
offers an interaction consideration, namely between elite conflict and mass mobilization, as
working causal mechanisms in explaining democratic breakdown. Specifically, the research will
demonstrate that without interacting with each other, each independent variable will not
significantly affect the dependent variable. Third, this study contributes to the discussion on how
new democratic countries grapple with a political crisis during their transitional period by
bringing mass mobilization into the analysis. As I demonstrate, mass mobilization is an
important factor causing democratic breakdown that is relatively overlooked by existing studies.
The remainder of this paper will discuss the following: First, I define key concepts that I
utilize in this study. Second, I present the relevant literature on the explanations related to the

6

different outcomes of democratization. Third, I discuss the argument and working hypotheses
that I will examine in this study. Fourth, I present the case studies of Egypt and Indonesia based
on the use of extensive secondary literature. The last section concludes the overall discussion.

7

KEY CONCEPTS
I follow the minimalist definition of democracy (electoral democracy), conceived as a
political regime in which the top executive and legislative offices of government are selected
through free, fair, and regular elections (Schumpeter [1947] 2003; Diamond 1999; Alvarez et al
1996, 4-5; Linz 1978, 5; Dahl 1971). A democracy breaks down when that democratic state
suffers a change of political regime, or a transfer of legitimacy to another political institution,
through either violent or non-violent takeover of power (Linz 1978, 27). As history has revealed,
in most modern democratic states, democracy breaks down when the military launches a coup to
take over the power from the democratic elected government. Some examples are Fiji (2006),
Thailand (2006, 2014), Mali (2012), and Egypt (2013).5
This study defines elites as “the persons who occupy strategic positions in public and
private bureaucratic organizations (e.g. governments, parties, militaries, productive enterprises,
trade unions and other occupational organizations, as well as media, religious and educational
organizations, various organized protest groups, and so on)” (Field and Higley 1980, 20). Elite
conflict or elite competition occurs when an elite coalition attempts to undermine another elite
coalition’s capacity in a struggle for power. I divide elite conflict into two patterns: (1) elite
conflict whose coalition accumulates the support of different political groups which widen the

5

Another type is that a democracy breaks down through revolutionary mobilization of the masses, especially by
leftist parties, although this is rare. For example, the Czechoslovakia of 1948 was the democratic country taken over
by the Communists (Linz 1978, 27). In addition, democracy breaks down when democratically elected leaders end
the democratic process themselves through acts such as suspending the constitution, arresting opposition politicians,
restricting mass media, or cheating on election results. For examples are the case of Alberto Fujimori of Peru (April
1992) (Maeda 2010, 1130) and Kenya in December 2007 (Ulfelder 2010, 2).
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conflict from elites to the masses; (2) elite conflict whose coalition gains less mass support and is
unable to broaden in scope.
Mass mobilization refers to mass protests or rallies, which embody the political activation
of the popular sector, from activists to ordinary citizens and united temporarily by the shared
political preferences (O’Donnell 1988, 23; Onuch 2014, 4). The embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite competition is the expansion of the political arena, where parties,
movements, or government personnel mobilize classes or social sectors on the basis of collective
identities that conflict with other participants in the political arena (O’Donnell 1988, 24-25). The
embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite competition reflects (1) the linkage between elites
and mass mobilization during a political conflict, (2) the strength of the cohesion between elites
and their mass, and (3) the extent of the loyalty of the mass to their elites.
I utilize categories of scope and scale to assess the level of embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite competition. The level of embeddedness is high when mass mobilization
involves cross-cleavage coalition and nation-wide mobilization. In contrast, the level of
embeddedness is low when the mass mobilization involves limited coalitions and small scale
mobilization (Onuch 2014, 4). Table 1 reveals my concept on the levels of embeddedness of
mass mobilization in a more systematic way.

9

Table 1. Levels of Embeddedness of Mass Mobilization in Elite Competition

High Level Embeddedness
Low Level Embeddedness

Scope of Mass
Mobilization

Scale of Mass
Mobilization

Cross-cleavage
political mobilization
Limited coalitions of
political mobilization

Nation-wide
mobilization
Small scale
mobilization
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DEBATES
There are three broad camps on theoretical approaches that attempt to explain different
regime outcomes during democratization. One set of studies emphasizes the effects of structural
factors such as modernization, economic performance, and class. The second array of arguments
emphasizes the role of institutional factors such as the nature of the party system, the systems of
government, and international factors in uncovering the causes of different regime outcomes.
The third group of explanations proposes elite coalition explanations for understanding the
survival and the collapse of democratic regimes.

Structural Explanations
The structural approach of democratic breakdown identifies elements of context that are
considered to create opportunities that affect the breakdown of democratic regimes (Mainwaring
and Pérez-Liñán 2003). One sort of structural approach is modernization theory. This theory
suggests that the level of modernization has a significant impact on the possibility of the survival
of democracy in a country (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1992). However, some scholars argue that modernization does not
necessarily increase the likelihood that democratic regimes will survive (O’Donnell 1973;
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2003). For example, the modernization theory would seem
inconsistent with the case of Thailand, which experienced democratic breakdown following the
tensions between different socio-economic classes, despite the country’s success in economic
modernization (Nguyen 2011).
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Another type of structural theory concerns economic performance. This theory argues
that democratic regimes are more likely to break down if their economic performance is poor
(Diamond 1999: 77-93; Geddes 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Przeworski et al. 2000).
However, many cases reveal that democracy survives even in the countries that have a low level
of economic performance. Some countries in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Timor Leste, are among the countries that have maintained democracies despite
relatively low levels of economic performance.
Another body of arguments emphasizes the importance of class structure. This theory
claims that the nature of the class structure significantly influences the prospects for democracy
(Diamond 1992; Lipset 1959; Moore 1966). For example, it is argued that the working class
prefers democracy and the dominant class opposes it based on the assumption that democracy
allocates income to the poor (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). However,
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) argue particular social classes do not always prefer
democracy, but support a democratic regime or its alternative based on the advantages and
disadvantages the regime offers them. For example, the Argentine union movement supported
the authoritarian regime of Juan Peron (1946-55) because of the material and organizational
benefits Peron provided for Argentine workers (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2012, 8).
A number of scholars unravel the effects of resource redistribution in sustaining
democratic stability and avoiding the threat of democratic takeover (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and
Robinson 2006, Morrison 2009). However, as Slater, Smith, and Nair (2014) demonstrate,
democratic breakdowns are neither triggered by successful redistributive policies nor followed
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by their reversal. Instead, their study confirms, “contemporary democratic breakdowns have
political origins in weak states” (Slater, Smith, and Nair 2014, 353). Slater, Smith, and Nair carry
out correlative analyses of cross-sectional time series data from 139 countries between 1972 and
2007. Their finding demonstrate that, contrary to the expectations of the redistributive argument,
redistributive taxation is negatively associated with the incidence of military coups and the
likelihood of a democratic breakdown (Slater, Smith, and Nair 2014).

Institutional Explanations
The first type of institutional explanation of democratic failure emphasizes party system
fragmentation. The theory suggests that presidential regimes with fragmented party systems are
more vulnerable to break down. When presidents have minority support in the legislature, the
deadlock between the president and legislature will be more common and may lead to
democratic breakdown (Linz 1994; Mainwaring 1993; and Stepan and Skach 1994). However,
according to Cheibub (2002), there is no significant relationship between party system
fragmentation and democratic survival in presidential systems. He notes that the breakdown of
democratic regimes is the result of presidential systems being installed in inappropriate settings,
such as countries with a strong military legacy where democracy was unlikely to endure
(Cheibub 2002; 2007).
The second type of institutional explanation is the presidential powers theory, which
argues that presidentialism functions more effectively with weaker constitutional presidential
powers. Presidents that have high concentrations of power will be more likely to by-pass the
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legislature. This, in turn, may provoke tensions between these institutions leading to political
crisis that paves the way for democratic breakdown (Shugart and Carey 1992). In her review of
Shugart and Carey’s work that studied the Latin American experience with presidentialism in the
twentieth century, Geddes finds little difference between cases of stable democracies (30 or more
years of uninterrupted democracy) in strong presidents-weak parties (such as Chile, Colombia,
and Uruguay) and in weak presidents-strong parties (such as Venezuela, Costa Rica, and the
Dominican Republic). In each of Shugart and Carey’s categories, Geddes finds a number of
unstable countries that are close to authoritarian type and that have not been long enough to be
categorized as democratic (Geddes 1994, 245).
The third type of institutional approach is the international factor explanation. In the
aftermath of the “third wave” of global democratization that began in 1974, scholars have been
concerned with international factors in explaining regime change and stability (Levitsky and
Way 2010; 2005; Pevehouse 2002; Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2007; Hyde 2010). For
example, US democratic assistance, especially under the National Endowment for Democracy
and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)’s Democracy and
Governance Office, has been argued to have a considerable effect on the likelihood of transitions
to democracy and on the maintenance of democratic stability. Therefore, the existence of
international linkage will affect democratic stability and its absence may pave the way for
democratic breakdown.
However, some studies find that international factors do not necessarily lead to regime
change or democratic stability (Knack 2004; Carothers 1999). For example, one type of
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international factor is to force “other states to be free by imposing democracy on them during
military interventions” (Peceny 1999). This produces little, if any, improvement, and often leads
to the erosion of democratic development (Mesquita and Downs 2006). Another instance is
Knack’s study on the impact of aid on democratization in a large sample of recipient nations
during the 1975-2000. His study shows an insignificant correlation between the 1975-2000
changes in the Freedom House index and foreign aid during the years 1975-1999. Based on the
finding, Knack concludes that there is no strong evidence that foreign aid promotes democracy
and hence can avoid democratic breakdown (Knack 2004, 257).

Elite Coalition Explanations
The first type of elite theory used to explain democratic breakdown is the strategic actor
approach, which emphasizes the role of political elites, their commitments, and their strategic
choices. This theory suggests that actors’ attitudes are important in explaining democratic
survival and breakdown (Linz 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Berman 1998).
The strategic actor approach contends that democracy breaks down when opponents aim
to change the existing regime. During a political crisis, such opposition can mobilize the support
of citizens to break the regime and even trigger civil war (Linz 1978, 27). This argument focuses
on the behavior of opposition actors who might possibly be motivated to take action if the
government’s legitimacy declines. Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2012) point out the strategic
actor approach focuses on the regime coalitions without analyzing the specific actors that
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underpinned those regime coalitions such as political parties, labor unions, mass organizations,
and the military (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2012, 10).
Based on such a critique, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán propose an alternative argument
they refer to as actors’ policy preferences. This argument points out: (1) actors’ policies have a
big influence on the capacity of democratic regimes to survive—the winning of radical actors
will likely encourage the losers to resort to coups; (2) actors that have a normative preference for
democracy will pave the way for democratic regimes to survive; (3) a more democratic regional
political environment will diminish the possibility of democratic regimes to break down, which
is compatible with the literature on international influences on democratization (Mainwaring and
Pérez-Liñán 2012).
In general, this literature review reveals that most studies on democratization provide
little attention to popular mobilization (Bermeo 1997). In modern democratic states, in fact, only
the direct intervention of the military is commonly able to topple regimes (Linz 1978, 15).
However, the decision of the military to launch a coup is usually based on the rational
calculation of success during the time of the loss of legitimacy6 in the incumbent government as
a result of domestic circumstances such as crisis and power-vacuum situations (Finer 1962; Linz
1978, 17). Therefore, at least theoretically, widespread mass mobilization will be a crucial

6

Linz (1978) suggests “legitimacy” as “a legitimate government is one considered to be the least evil of the forms of
government. Ultimately, democratic legitimacy is based on the belief that for that particular country at that particular
historical juncture no other type of regime could assure a more successful pursuit of collective goals.” In all,
democratic legitimacy “require adherence to the rules of the game by both a majority of the voting citizens and those
in positions of authority, as well as trust on the party of the citizenry in the government’s commitment to uphold
them” (Linz 1978, 17-18).
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consideration for the military before deciding to take over power from an incumbent
government.
The three camps of explanation on democratic breakdown have overlooked political
mobilization as manifested in various mass protests during a political crisis. Therefore, the
explanations avoid addressing Bermeo’s analysis: “if a transition is to be carried out
successfully, the ‘threat from below’ must somehow be moderated” (Bermeo 1997, 306). This
thesis will fill such a theoretical gap by elaborating on the interactive condition as reflected by
the embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite competition during political crisis, and hence
paves the way for a power takeover.
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ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES
As stated earlier, my argument is this: divergent levels of the embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite competition during political crisis in the period of democratic transition
result in either the survival or the breakdown of democratic regimes. This argument is inspired
by Luebbert (1991) who argues, “To be sure, leaders did make choice that had implications for
the regime outcomes; leadership choices were the mediating agent between inherited social and
political contexts—‘structures’ in the argot of social science—and the eventual regime outcomes.
For better or worse, however, those choices were always consistent with the short-term
imperatives of the pursuit of power through the optimization of mass support” (Luebbert 1991,
306).
My argument puts emphasis on the interaction of two variables: elite conflict and mass
mobilization. I argue elite variables alone are inadequate in explaining democratic breakdown.
Interaction variable refers to the impact of one particular variable on the outcome (dependent
variable) depends on the varying levels of another variable. In this case, the impact of elite
conflict (main independent variable) on democratic survival or breakdown will vary in line with
the changing levels of the embeddedness of mass mobilization (moderation variable). In other
words, my argument implies that elite coalitions can lead to the breakdown of democratic regime
only when they can mobilize mass (people power) to struggle for power or to demand the
removal of high officials, including presidents, from office. Military intervention will be an
intervening variable in this study, where it follows an independent variable (levels of the
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embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict) but precedes the dependent
variable (democratic survival or breakdown) in a causal sequence.
Figure 1 summarizes my argument, which represents the causal relationships. The
argument in this analysis unfolds in several steps. It begins with the description of a political
crisis that takes place in the new democratic countries studied in this research. In general, a
political crisis reveals the lack of efficacy or effectiveness of governments. I will analyze the
patterns of conflicts among elites and then look at the issues or policies of the governments that
trigger the conflicts. In the next step, I will uncover whether the elite leaders that are involved in
such conflicts activate their supporters or not in the forms of mass rallies. Therefore, the
following step will be an analysis on how mass mobilization grows and how the interaction
between elite leaders and mass mobilization take place. Finally, it will include a description on
how the power takeover occurs. This is initiated by the perception among military leaders that
the country is in danger. Broad elite-mass coalitions unified by shared support for opposing the
incumbent government lead to a military takeover in the name of political stability to avoid mass
unrest, causing a democratic breakdown.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for Explaining Variation in Regime Outcomes
Variables
Conditions under
transition

Political Crisis:
lack of efficacy
or effectiveness
of governments

Independent

Dependent/Intervening

Dependent

High embeddedness
of mass mobilization
in elite competition

Military
intervention

Democratic
breakdown

Low embeddedness
of mass mobilization
in elite competition

Non-military
intervention

Democratic
survival

Following this logic, my hypotheses regarding democratic breakdown are as follows:
H1: In the stage of democratic transition, regimes that experience high levels of the
embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite competition during a political crisis are more likely
to experience democratic breakdown.
H2: In the stage of democratic transition, regimes that experience low levels of the
embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite competition during a political crisis are more likely
to experience democratic survival.
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METHOD
This study will be a comparative analysis with the intention to, borrowing from Slater
and Ziblatt (2013), “generate cross-case and out-of sample (i.e., external validity).” I apply
Mill’s method of difference, which means explicating what the cases have in common and then
finding the differences between the two cases which potentially produce different outcomes
(Skocpol 1979, 36; Lijphart 1971, 687-688).
Process tracing will be employed to identify causal chain and causal mechanism between
an independent variable/variables and the dependent variable/outcome (George and Bennett,
2005: 206). In addition, process tracing facilitates looking at “evidence within an individual case,
or a temporally and spatially bound instance of a specified phenomenon, to derive and/or test
alternative explanations of that case” (Bennett, 2008: 704).
This study will use a controlled comparison of case studies as a strategy to “select cases
for analysis that either exhibit contrasting outcomes despite their many otherwise similar
characteristics, or similar outcomes despite their many otherwise contrasting characteristics”
(Slater and Ziblatt 2013). In short, I select cases based on the dependent variable (outcome). This
may bias the conclusions that will be reached (Geddes 1990). However, different from
quantitative studies that employ the “effects-of-causes” approach, this study decidedly applies a
qualitative method, which adopts the “causes-of-effects” approach for the explanation (Mahoney
and Goertz 2006; Geddes 1990). By including both a positive case (where the outcome of
interest occurs) and a negative case (where the outcome of interest did not occur) I aim to
provide a theoretical contribution.
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This study will rely on secondary sources such as research monographs, books, journal
articles, and newspapers. To my good fortune, the two countries I analyze have been extensively
researched by a number of scholars in political science, sociology, anthropology, and history.
This study’s task, borrowing Skocpol’s statement, “lies not in revealing new data about
particular aspects of the large time periods and diverse places surveyed in the comparative study,
but rather in establishing the interest and prima facie validity of an overall argument” (Skocpol
1979, xiv).
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CASE SELECTION
In order to test my hypotheses, I select two cases: Egypt and Indonesia. Despite their
contrasting outcomes, the two cases share some similar characteristics. In this part, I will discuss
briefly on such characteristics in order to provide possible alternative explanations as a control
for the explanatory variable proposed in this thesis.
First, Egypt and Indonesia are countries where Muslims make the majority of the
population. More importantly, the two countries have experienced extensive Islamist political
mobilization, where many of their elites were involved in political movements against
authoritarian regimes (Munhanif 2011; Wickham 2002). During a democratic transition, the
Islamist organizations established political parties and took part in democratic elections to win
seats in parliament, and even joined the elected ruling coalition.
However, the rivalry between the secularist and the Islamist elites continued during the
transition. Differing from Egyptian case, where Islamist parties gained the majority of the vote in
the 2011 election, Indonesia’s Islamist parties, which obtained less than 10 percent combined
(King 2003, 83), were not able to defeat their competitors in the 1999 election. Nevertheless, in
the debates of the 2000 Constitutional amendment in the Assembly sessions, Islamist parties
resurrected the long-buried debate on the state philosophical foundation by emphasizing their
Islamic ideology and proposing an article on the implementation of Islamic law (Ambardi 2008,
213-219). In Egypt, although the call for an imposition of Islamic law was absent after the
January 2011 Revolution, the worries and the fear, especially among the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF) and secular elites, that the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood
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(MB) would be followed by the implementation of Islamic law were rampant (Masoud 2014; El
Fadl 2015).
Do identity politics and ideological cleavage contribute to the Egypt’s democratic
breakdown? Masoud points out there is, in fact, an argument that considers the Islamist agenda a
threat to Egyptian identity and hence became a popular reason for rejecting the MB. However, he
demonstrates, even though the Tamarod (Arabic for “rebel”) movement included oppositions to
the Morsi’s government, and the MB more generally, the movement’s public statements made
little mention of Islam or Islamic law. Instead, the Tamarod petition demanded Morsi’s
government to deliver economic development and egalitarianism (Masoud 2014, 209-210). In
addition, Egypt was not the only country that underwent an Islamist electoral victory during the
so-called Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the Islamist party al-Nahda won 41 percent of 217 parliament
seats and emerged as the single largest bloc in the legislature (Masoud 2014, 194). But, the
disagreement between Islamists and secularists in Tunisia on the role of Islamic law in the
constitution had not been a source of conflict as among Egyptian parties (Brownlee, Masoud, and
Reynolds 2015, 195). This, in turn, allowed the Tunisia’s newly democratic government to
maintain their democracy compared to the Egypt’s. In short, ideological difference was not the
main explanation for the Egypt’s democratic collapse.
Second, in terms of political institutions, the two countries adopted multiparty systems
and dealt with fragmented political leaderships, in which the elites were divided by multiple
cleavages. Indonesia’s 1999 election revealed the continued reality of the basic cleavage in the
electorate between nationalist parties, religiously inclusive parties, and Islamic parties (King
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2003, 224). Ambardi demonstrates the religious issue during 1999 election produced most
ideological differences, dividing political parties into two camps, the Islamic from the secular
parties. The Islamic parties campaigned on political agendas to insert Islamic law into the
Indonesian legal system (Ambardi 2008, 313). The strong ethnic, religious, and cultural
cleavages make the Indonesian elites afraid of a fragmented party system. Therefore, they
rejected the proposal of an American two-party system and a plurality system in electoral rules
that they viewed will potentially sharpen political conflicts. They prefer the proportional
representation system that gives advantages to the new parties established during the transition to
gain seats in the legislature (Horowitz 2013, 266-267).
Similarly, the results of the Egypt’s 2011 election have reflected two broad political
cleavages: the secularists and Islamists. By June 2011, there were as many as seventeen
identifiably Islamic parties (Masoud 2014, 132, 141). On the secular side, there were liberals,
socialists, and the former ruling party National Democratic Party (NDP). The process for
determining the electoral rules for the country’s founding election was dictated by the SCAF
(Bellin 2012, 43-45). The SCAF preferred a hybrid system in which only two third of the
legislature’s 498 elected seats would be chosen according to a system of closed list proportional
representation, while the remaining one third elected through a majoritarian system. Regardless
the fact that the military chose these systems explicitly in order to hinder an Islamist victory, the
Islamists captured the majority of the seats in parliament (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds
2015, 113).
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Nevertheless, as Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds argue, electoral rules have different
outcomes: in Tunisia it helped to avoid Islamist dominance, but in Egypt it did not. Instead of
arguing the causal effect of electoral institutions on the broad shapes of the partisan landscape,
Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds claim that political institutions were a reflection of the relative
power of different political parties rather than a cause. They suggest looking at structural
elements by arguing “any explanation of variation in Islamist electoral dominance must attend to
the pre-existing distribution of power among Islamists and their rivals” (Brownlee, Masoud, and
Reynolds 2015, 201).
Third, the two countries have been ruled by authoritarian regimes before they underwent
democratic transition. In 1998, Indonesia experienced a major political transition that started
with the toppling of Soeharto’s 32-year-old authoritarian regime. Equally, in 2011, a democratic
transition took place in Egypt following the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year-old
dictatorship. The remnants of the authoritarian regimes continued to influence political
arrangements during democratization (Masoud 2014; Tomsa 2008). Most importantly, the
militaries in the two countries have played a central role in governance and have been involved
extensively in economic ventures, which to some extent continued during the period of
democratic transition. This revealed why the military has a considerable role in the political
realm in both countries (Bellin 2012; Mietzner 2009).
Prior to the democratic transition, Egypt and Indonesia were praetorian7 regimes

7

Praetorianism refers to the intervention of the military in politics. This term has also been generally used to refer to
the phenomena of the politization of social forces. The phrase “praetorian society” is used to refer to a politicized
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(Sundhaussen 1978 cited by Mietzner 2011, 129; Perlmutter 1974 cited by El Fadl 2015, 254),
where the military was part of the bureaucratic state, involved itself in political affairs, and
expanded its economic enterprises by taking control over state companies and monopolies. In
Egypt, since 1952, the military has been central actor in politics (Cook 2007). SCAF’s personnel
are almost 20 times larger than Tunisia's armed forces and it has been ranked in the top 20
percent of nations in terms of militarization (Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 191). In the
post-Mubarak Egypt, SCAF protected the extensive economic interests of the senior and retired
officer corps. SCAF maintained control of the transition by, among others, organizing a
constitutional referendum on March 19, 2011 (Henry 2012, 68-71). On June 18, 2012, SCAF
passed the infamous “revisions” to the first Constitutional Declaration, which isolates the army
from accountability and grants it veto power over the act of declaring war (El-Fadl 2015, 259).
In the New Order period, Indonesian military was heavily involved in political affairs.
The Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) was a key component of Soeharto’s New Order regime for
more than three decades (1966-1998) (Mietzner 2011; Slater 2010). The military justified its
political involvement with the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine, which granted the armed
forces both security and non-security roles. After the overthrow of the Soeharto regime in 1998,
Indonesian military’s engagement in politics and society declined slowly (Mietzner 2009).
However, during Wahid’s presidency, the Indonesian military's role in legislative and executive
institutions was still significant as proven by the military representation in the legislatures, which
had 38 seats in the national legislature and 10 percent of the seats in each local parliament
society, where the participation not only of the military but other social forces as well, including the participation of
student and religious leaders in politics (Huntington 1968, 195).
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(Mietzner 2011, 129-143).
Furthermore, there were some indicators that Egypt and Indonesia during the democratic
transition were praetorian societies, in which social forces, including religious leaders and
student movements, participated extensively in politics. Egypt’s Mohamed Morsi was the head
of Freedom Justice Party (FJP), MB’s party. The MB has influenced Islamist movements around
the world with its model of political and social activism and was estimated to have 500,000
members. Morsi’s November 2012 Constitutional Declaration, which announced that the
presidency was above the law, made it easier for his opponents to call him authoritarian and
triggered the public wrath. Indonesia’s Abdurrahman Wahid was the founder of the National
Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the Nahdlatul Ulama’s party. The NU,
where Wahid was its chairman during the 1980s and 1990s, is the world’s largest organization of
traditionalist Muslims and is believed to have 30 million members. Wahid was “an eccentric and
maverick leader” (Barton 2002, 285) whose decisions triggered the severe rivalry between
himself and the parliament. When the rivalry between the two institutions worsened, Wahid
issued a presidential decree to shut down the Assembly, which triggered the Assembly to dismiss
him from office.
Table 2 summarizes the shared characteristics of the two cases discussed above. In all,
although such characteristics are important to understand the institutional and structural
conditions that the new regimes in the two countries had to face during the democratic transition,
the characteristics could not explain the varied regime outcomes of the two cases. Nevertheless,
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the shared characteristics have been main reasons of selecting the two countries as case studies
of this thesis.

Table 2. The Shared Characteristics of Egypt and Indonesia During Transition

Country
Cases
Egypt
Indonesia

Previous
Islamist
Party
Regime
Mobilization
System
Authoritarian High
Multiparty
Authoritarian High
Multiparty

Military
Cohesion
High
Intermediate

Regime Outcome
Democratic breakdown
Democratic survival

Sources: Slater (2010); King (2003); Bellin (2012); Masoud (2014); Tomsa (2008) Munhanif (2011); Wickham
(2002); Mietzner (2009; 2011); Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds (2015); Cook (2007).
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CASE STUDIES

Egypt (2012-2013)
Egypt is a case of a high-level embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict during
political crisis in the period of democratic transition. As I expect, a high level embeddedness of
mass mobilization in elite conflict during political crisis has caused a military intervention and
thus resulted in democratic breakdown. In Egypt, a high level of embeddedness of mass
mobilization in an elite conflict triggered the Egyptian military’s decision to take over. As a
result, Egyptian democracy broke down.
After the downfall of Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has emerged as one
of the key political forces in Egypt.8 It filled the political vacuum left by the former National
Democratic Party (NDP) that dominated the country for more than three decades (al-Anani 2015,
229). In June 2011, the MB founded its Freedom Justice Party (FJP), and with the Salafist alNour Party won about 72 percent of the seats in the Lower House.9 In the June 2012 presidential

8

For example, in March 2011 Constitutional Referendum, 77 percent of Egyptians voted “Yes” for the amendments
supported by the Islamist current, namely the MB and the Salafis. The remaining 23 percent of Egyptians said “No,”
which means they wanted a new constitution to be immediately drafted to replace the current 1971 Constitution. The
latter group was supported by the liberals, which include al-Ghad Party and the al-Wafd Party, and the Socialist and
leftist parties and movements such as al-Tagammu Party, the Nasserist Party, and the Karamah Party. “FAQs on
Egypt's constitutional referendum,” Ahram Online, March 18, 2011. www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/7998.aspx
(accessed March 17, 2016).
9
Egyptians voted to elect the 498 members of the People's Assembly during December 2011-January 2012
election. The result was: FJP - 235 seats (47.2%), Nour Party - 121 seats (24.3%), New Wafd Party - 38 seats
(7.6%), Egyptian Bloc - 34 seats (6.8%), Al-Wasat Party - 10 seats (2.0%), Reform and Development Party - 9 seats
(1.8%), Revolution Continues - 7 seats (1.4%), Other parties - 18 seats (3.6%), Independents - 26 seats (5.2%), 10
seats also appointed by president/military council. “Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to parliament,” BBC News,
January 21, 2012. www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748 (accessed March 17, 2016).
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election, the MB presidential candidate, Mohamed Morsi, obtained a victory of 51.7 percent
against Ahmed Shafik, who gained 48.3 percent.10
Morsi was an engineering professor and a member of the MB since 1979. In 1995,
he became a member of the MB’s Guidance Bureau, the MB’s highest decision-making body. He
was a member of parliament from 2000 to 2005 as an independent, because Mubarak’s
administration disallowed the MB to nominate candidates for office. Following the downfall of
Mubarak’s regime, Morsi established the FJP in 2011 and then became the first democratically
elected president in Egypt’s history.11 President Morsi appointed a politically unknown figure,
Hisham Qandil, as prime minister, which triggered a suspicion that the president did not intend
to share his power. At the same time, he gave the MB members a number of ministerial positions
in his cabinet, including the ministries of housing, communication, media, manpower, and higher
education. Morsi also dismissed the SCAF’s most senior leaders, Field Marshal Hussein
Tantawi, Minister of Defense, and the army chief of staff, Sami Anan (Brownlee, Masoud, and
Reynolds 2015, 120). Even though young revolutionaries supported his latter move, liberal and
secular forces had interpreted such a decision as an attempt by the MB to seize more power (alAnani 2015, 232).
However, not long after his election, elite conflict and mass mobilization engulfed the
Morsi’s presidency. One of the most troubling actions taken by Morsi was his decision, in
November 2012, to issue a series of unilateral amendments to the Egyptian Constitution. He
10

“Celebration in Egypt as Morsi declared winner,” Aljazeera, June 24, 2012.
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201262412445190400.html (accessed March 17, 2016).
11
Mostafa Ali, “Mohamed Morsi,” Ahram Online, May 6, 2012. www. english.ahram.org.eg/News/40539.aspx
(accessed April 1, 2016).
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asserted that his word was “final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any
entity,” and he declared that he will “take the necessary actions and measures to protect the
country and the goals of revolution” (Masoud 2014, 216).12 Morsi’s decision had placed himself
and the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly above judicial review. This was, according to
Brownlee, similar to a self-coup by giving “ingredients” for a military takeover (Brownlee 2013)
or for popular movement to oust him (Masoud 2014, 216).
Morsi’s supporters justified such a decision to put the presidency above judicial review as
necessary to protect Egypt’s new democracy against the remnants of the Mubarak regime,
especially in the judiciary. The supporters believed the judiciary had proven itself hostile and
opposed to the MB. For instance, on the eve of Morsi’s election in June 2012, the Supreme
Constitutional Court dismissed the Islamist-dominated Lower House of parliament that had been
elected six months earlier (Masoud 2014, 216). While the MB allegedly considered the judiciary
as representing the counter-revolution pole, the judges viewed the new government was trying to
weaken the judiciary. In short, the judges’ hostility to the MB was based on their feelings of
being attacked by the presidency (Haenni 2016, 33-34).
Another source of elite conflict was polarization around identity issues that hindered the
formation of political consensus during democratic transition in post-Mubarak Egypt. The
attempts to build national political consensus never succeeded. In early June 2011, the FJP and
27 other political parties formed “the Democratic Alliance.” The Alliance included long-standing
opposition parties, such as the liberal al-Wafd Party, the socialist al-Tagammu, the Nasserist
12

“English text of Morsi's Constitutional Declaration,” Ahram Online, November 22, 2012.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/58947.aspx (accessed March 14, 2016).
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Party, and the al-Ghad Party, and parties formed after the January 2011 Revolution, such as the
nationalist al-Karama Party, the Islamist al-Wasat Party, the Egypt Freedom Party, and the
Salafist al-Nour Party. However, most of these parties left the coalition. The al-Wafd withdrew
from the Alliance in October 2011 when some of its leaders joined the Egyptian Bloc, an
electoral coalition funded by secular-leaning parties. The Egypt Freedom Party, a liberal party,
founded the Revolution Continues Alliance. The al-Nour Party established the Islamist Bloc,
which includes two other Islamist parties, al-Asala and Building and Development parties
(Haenni 2016, 20-21).13 In fact, the electoral system (proportional representation) was designed
to shape cross-aisle collaboration between Islamists and non-Islamists in Egypt’s new regime.
Although, Bellin insisted, “given the strong popular standing of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egyptian society, clever electoral engineering might not have been able to transform this result”
(Bellin 2012, 44-45).
Furthermore, even among the Islamists, a complete agreement never happened. The FJP
and the al-Nour Party were in agreement on identity issues but in competition on electoral issues.
They were allies for the first Constitutional Referendum in March 2011 and in drafting the
Constitution in 2012. However, they were rivals in the parliament election and in the presidential
election. They were in dispute over the cabinet reshuffle of May 2013, which reduced Salafi
presence in the government. The decrease in public trust toward the MB, following Morsi’s
Constitutional Declaration, reinforced the Salafi maneuvers to embody an alternative to the MB.

13

“Democratic Alliance (Freedom and Justice),” Ahram Online, November 18, 2011.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/26895.aspx (accessed March 16, 2016).
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The Salafi participated in the anti-MB movement a few months before the June 2013 protest, and
backed the subsequent military’s action against the MB (Haenni 2016, 22-23).
Most importantly, Morsi had never been able to control the military. The process of
transition was largely dictated by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that
constrained the new regime (Bellin 2012, 43-44). For example, SCAF organized a Constitutional
Referendum in March 2011 while controlling the transition by maintaining the 30-year old
Emergency Law (Henry 2012, 70-71). The MB and the military showed the extent of persistent
distrust on both sides. During political crisis, the SCAF tended to side with the liberals against
the Islamists. Morsi and the SCAF diverged on several issues regarding the Suez Canal, the Gaza
Strip, and borders. For example, the army’s decision to demolish the secret tunnels connecting
the Gaza Strip to Egypt triggered the wrath of the presidency and the MB (Haenni 2016, 30-33).
Mass mobilization embedded itself into the elite conflict during political turbulence
following Morsi’s November 2012 Constitutional Declaration. Such a declaration, which
announced the presidency was above the law, led him to be accused of being an authoritarian and
hence triggering the mass protests.14 The opposition forces, including the National Salvation
Front, April 6 Youth Movement (a leading force behind the 2011 Revolution), the Constitution
Party (founded by democracy advocate Mohamed El-Baradei), and a number of legal experts, all
who voiced their complete rejection of the moves Morsi had made. In response to the decree,

14

Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “What Led to Morsi’s Fall—and What Comes Next?” The Nation, July 5, 2013.
www.thenation.com/article/what-led-morsis-fall-and-what-comes-next/ (accessed March 17, 2016).
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over 30 opposition groups organized mass protests at the presidential palace in Cairo’s
Heliopolis district on December 9, 2012.15
As illustrated by Table 3, mass protests that criticized Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration
demonstrated cross-cleavage political mobilization. In May 2013, a group of young activists,
who called their movement as “Tamarod” (Arabic for “rebel”), launched a campaign to
overthrow Morsi by collecting signatures on a petition that demanded Morsi to step down. They
called for a mass protest on June 30 to mark the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration.16 A
number of Egypt’s prominent political forces, such as the Constitution Party and the al-Wafd
Party supported the anti-Morsi campaign.17 In addition, tens of thousands of previously
unpoliticized workers participated in militant demonstrations called by the National Salvation
Front against Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration. The Socialist Popular Alliance Party (SPA),
which included labor sympathizers such as the leaders of Egyptian Federation of Independent
Trade Unions (EFITU) (Abdalla 2016; Duboc 2014), also joined the National Salvation Front.18
The mass mobilization reached a massive scale larger than the January 2011 Revolution.
For example, on June 29, 2013, the Tamarod movement collected over 22 million signatures,
calling for Morsi's removal from office. The movement exceeded its original goal of 15 million
before June 30, 2013, to outnumber the 13 million voters who cast ballots for Morsi in the
15

“Egyptian reactions vary to President Morsi's new constitutional decree,” Ahram Online, December 9, 2012.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/60118.aspx (accessed March 6, 2016).
16
Sharif Abdel Kouddous, “What Led to Morsi’s Fall—and What Comes Next?” The Nation, July 5, 2013.
www.thenation.com/article/what-led-morsis-fall-and-what-comes-next/ (accessed March 17, 2016).
17
“More political parties join anti-Morsi petition campaign,” Ahram Online, May 16, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/71613.aspx (accessed March 17, 2016).
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Joel Beinin, “Workers, Trade Unions and Egypt's Political Future,” Middle East Research and Information
Project, January 18, 2013. www.merip.org/mero/mero011813 (accessed March 18, 2016).
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presidential elections one year earlier. Several rallies took place at Tahrir Square and the
presidential palace in the Heliopolis district, while similar rallies occurred in governorates across
the country. For instance, a week in advance of June 30, 2013, mass protests had already broken
out in Cairo, Alexandria, and several other governorates, including Daqahliya, Sharqiya, and
Zagazig. Around 17 million Egyptians went to the streets.19

Table 3. Anti-Morsi Mass Mobilization During December 2012 – July 2013

Date
December 2,
2012
December 4,
2012
December 5,
2012
December 7,
2012

December 9,
2012

January 25, 2013

January 28, 2013

Location
Supreme Constituional
Court, Cairo
Cairo
Presidential Palace and
Tahrir Square, Cairo
Presidential Palace and
Tahrir Square, Cairo

Tahrir Square, Cairo

Tahrir Square, Cairo;
Alexandria, Ismailia,
Damanhur, Port Said, and
Suez
11 Cities: Cairo,
Alexandria, Suez, Ismailia
and Port Said

Coalition

Mass Estimation

Mass

Hundreds

Mass; the Supreme Constitutional
Court
Mass; the National Salvation Front;
the Egyptian Popular Current;

Hundreds
A hundred
thousands

Mass

Tens of thousands

Mass; the April 6 Youth; the
Constitution Party; the National
Salvation Front; the Socialist the
Popular Alliance Party; the
Egyptian Federation of Independent
Trade Unions

Tens of thousands

Mass

Tens of Thousands

Mass; the National Salvation Front;
the Alliance of Revolutionary
Forces

Thousands

(Continued on following page)
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“Live updates: Millions join anti-Morsi protests in Egypt,” Ahram Online, June 30, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/75297.aspx (accessed March 17, 2016).
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Table 3. Continued.
Date

February 11,
2013
March 4, 2013

Location
Presidential Palace and
Tahrir Square, Cairo
Presidential Palace and
Tahrir Square, Cairo
Port Said

March 16, 2013

Sohag

Mass

Hundreds

May 17, 2013

Tahrir Square, Cairo

Mass; the Rebel Movement

Thousands

June 30, 2013

18 locations across Cairo;
Alexandria, El-Mahalla,
Daqahliya, Sharqiya,
Zagazig, cities of the Suez
Canal

July 1, 2013

Across countries

Mass; the Rebel Movement; the
Egyptian Movement for Change;
the National Salvation Front; the
Constitution Party and the al-Wafd
Party
Mass; the Rebel Movement; the
National Salvation Front

February 1, 2013

Coalition

Mass Estimation

Mass

Thousands

Mass

Thousands

Mass

Thousands

Millions

Millions

After Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration, Egypt was divided between mass protests
demanding Morsi’s removal, and the supporters of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration. The proMorsi alliance was led by the MB and included the FJP, the Islamist Wasat Party, the Salafist
Watan Party, and the Building and Development Party.20 Islamist forces staged at Rabaa AlAdawiya Mosque in Cairo’s Nasr City, which numbered in the hundreds of thousands.21 The
demonstrations were overshadowed by clashes between supporters and opponents of the
president in governorates throughout Egypt, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. In
addition, unknown assailants attacked several of the MB’s regional offices.22 For example, fierce
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“Revolution part 2: The fall of Mohamed Morsi,” Ahram Online, July 3, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/75614.aspx (accessed March 17, 2016).
21
“Live updates: Millions join anti-Morsi protests in Egypt,” Ahram Online, June 30, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/75297.aspx (accessed March 17, 2016).
22
“Egypt's post-revolution timeline: Two years of turmoil,” Ahram Online, Jan 25, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/63151.aspx (accessed March 18, 2016).
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clashes broke out in Alexandria, and the MB’s offices and the FJP headquarters in the Nile Delta
and Alexandria were firebombed and ransacked, resulting in several deaths.23
When the MB’s relations with other political forces worsened, on July 1, 2013, the
military released a statement giving Morsi 48 hour ultimatum to accommodate the people’s
demands and threatened to carry out its own roadmap for Egypt’s future if Morsi did not comply
(Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 125). When Morsi did not consider the ultimatum
seriously, on July 3, 2013, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi ousted President Morsi, suspending the
Constitution, and handing over power to the head of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court. El-Sisi
gave his speech accompanied by a number of top military and police officials, as well as the
Coptic Orthodox Patriarch Tawadros II, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Ahmed El-Tayyeb, the
National Salvation Front delegate Mohamed El-Baradei, a representative of the Salafist al-Nour
Party, anti-Morsi Tamarod founder Mohamed Abdel-Aziz, and a senior judicial figure.24
Indeed, the military have been the most decisive factor in determining post-Mubarak
Egypt (El Fadl 2015, 261). Although President Morsi had previously replaced Field Marshal
Hussein Tantawi with a young officer Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to disengage the military’s political
involvement in the political process, he was still unable to control the military (Brownlee,
Masoud, and Reynolds 2015, 120-121). While the military views itself as an autonomous
institutional actor with a privileged political role, unfortunately, not all political parties and
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“Live updates: Millions join anti-Morsi protests in Egypt,” Ahram Online, June 30, 2013.
www.english.ahram.org.eg/News/75297.aspx (accessed March 17, 2016).
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“Revolution part 2: The fall of Mohamed Morsi,” Ahram Online, July 3, 2013.
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political elites since the ouster of Mubarak proposed diminishing the SCAF’s prerogatives and
immunities.25
To conclude, mass mobilization was highly embedded in elite conflict during the political
crisis of Morsi’s presidency. The cross-cleavage mobilization and the massive scale mobilization
that took place during the political crisis provided the chance for the military to intervene in the
name of “the people’s demands.” With the high embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite
conflict, the military obtained legitimacy to take over and caused the breakdown of Egypt’s
nascent democratic experience.

Indonesia (1999-2001)
Indonesia is a case of a low level embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite competition
during political crisis in the period of democratic transition. As stated, elite competition during
political crisis will influence the legitimacy of the government. However, when mass
mobilization is low, the elite conflict may not trigger a military takeover. Thus, elite conflict with
low embeddedness of mass mobilization does not cause democratic breakdown.
The selection of Abdurrahman Wahid marked the opening of a new democratic era after a
year of transition following the toppling of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. President Wahid was
elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)26 on October 20, 1999. Amien Rais of the
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Yezid Sayigh, “Morsi and Egypt's Military,” Al-Monitor, January 8, 2013. www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/morsi-army-egypt-revolution.html# (accessed April 1, 2016).
26
The Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or MPR is the highest constitutional body of Indonesia. It consists of all the
500 members of the Parliament or legislative body (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) and another 200 special
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National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) took the lead of Muslim parties to form
a coalition named Central Axis (Poros Tengah), which consisted of the National Awakening
Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan, PPP), the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), and the Justice Party
(Partai Keadilan, PK). The Central Axis coalition nominated Wahid of PKB as their presidential
candidate and he defeated Megawati Soekarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP), who had been the first winner of the
1999 parliament election.27 With the support of Wahid, Soekarnoputri was then elected as Vice
President (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006; Barton 2002; Haramain 2004).
Wahid’s party, the PKB, is the main party of Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest
organization of traditionalist Muslims and is believed to have 30 million members. Wahid was
the chairman of NU during the 1980s and 1990s. Besides being an Islamic cleric (kiai), Wahid
was known for his activism in pro-democracy movement since the 1980s and his strong
commitment to liberal values such as human rights, civil liberties, and pluralism (Budiman 2001,
146; Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 262; ICG Asia Briefing Paper February 21, 2001, 2). At the
same time, he is perceived by his followers as a wali, saint person who has super-human power
from God (Budiman 2001, 146).
members (appointees and regional representatives) of the MPR. Based on pre-amendment of 1945 Constitution, the
700 members elect the President and also have the power to impeach him or her (Budiman 2001).
27
The top seven 1999 election as follows: the winner is the PDI-P that gained 33.74 percent votes with the
acquisition of 153 seats. Golkar obtained 22.44 percent votes, so getting 120 seats or lose 205 seats compared to the
1997 election. PKB gained 12.61 percent, with 51 seats. PPP obtained 10.71 percent, gaining 58 seats or lose 31
seats compared to the 1997 election. PAN won 7.12 percent votes, gaining 34 seats. PBB gained 1.94 percent with
13 seats. PK obtained 1.36 percent with 7 seats. Source: King 2003,78;
www.kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999.
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As the first democratically elected president, Wahid dealt with “a great sense of
expectation” (Kingsbury 2001, 1; Barton 2002, 285). But, he came into power when Indonesia
was still in deep trouble in terms of economy, rule of law, sectarian conflicts, separatism,
military domination, and the continuity of the former ruling party, Golkar (Budiman 2001;
Emmerson 2000; Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006; ICG Asia Briefing Paper February 21, 2001,
Barton 2001). In addition, Wahid was a leader with serious shortcomings,28 which include erratic
behavior and a lack of managerial skills (Budiman 2001, 157; Barton 2002, 285). Through his
decisions and policies, he triggered the rivalry between himself and other institutions during his
presidency.
A political crisis began when Wahid dismissed some of his ministers of his coalition. For
example, he discharged Hamzah Haz (PPP) in November 1999 (Kompas, November 27, 1999),
asked General Wiranto to resign in February 2000, and removed two ministers, Laksamana
Sukardi (PDIP) and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar) in April 2000. He replaced them with his close
confidants. At the end of June 2000, Wahid discharged the Governor of the Bank Indonesia
(Central Bank), Syahril Sabirin, who was a Golkar Party member (Budiman 2001, 148). In
August 2000, Wahid announced a new Cabinet consisting of persons closely affiliated with him
or his party. In addition, he did not even consult Vice President Soekarnoputri, who then
expressed her anger by refusing to attend Wahid’s announcement of his new Cabinet before
Parliament (Tempo Interaktif, August 23, 2000; Budiman 2001, 148-149). These decisions shook
his coalitions with PDIP, Golkar, and even with his core supporters in the Central Axis (Kompas,
28

In terms of health, Wahid suffered two strokes of early 1998 resulted in his consequent blindness.
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April 25, 2000; Budiman 2001, 147-148), which then triggered the Legislature to use the
interpellation right to question such decisions (Haramain 2004, 270-271).
The failure to maintain a relationship with Vice-President Soekarnoputri, who had the
largest faction in parliament, had been the biggest mistake of Wahid’s presidency. Wahid never
really gave Soekarnoputri a fair role in his administration (Barton 2004, 311, 313; ICG Asia
Briefing Paper February 21, 2001, 6-7; Haramain 2004, 271-273). Furthermore, Wahid’s efforts
to restructure the military led to his loss of overall command that contributed to his downfall.
During his presidency, Wahid made at least four rotations of military positions (February 2000,
June 2000, September 2000, October 2000). More than a hundred officers were replaced and at
least 12 generals were removed (Budiman 2001, 152-153; Haramain 2004, 231-267).
Nevertheless, there were some indicators that Wahid was still unable to control the military. For
example, the killings and kidnappings continued in Aceh, even though Wahid had instructed the
military to stop the repressive actions (Budiman 2001, 153-154; Haramain 2004).
The allegation of corruption and scandals were the main sources of political crisis during
Wahid’s presidency. The first scandal is known as “Buloggate.” This scandal began in May
2000, when Wahid asked the State Logistics Agency (Bulog) to provide an amount of cash to
help community welfare programs in Aceh to reinforce his moves to negotiate peace in the
troubled province. In early May, a significant sum of money, almost $4 million (US), had gone
missing from Bulog’s reserve account. The person to whom it had allegedly been handed was
Soewondo, his masseur. There was no suggestion of any link between Wahid or his family and
Soewondo. Nevertheless, Wahid’s political enemies insinuated that Wahid had been involved in
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the scandal resulting in the damage of his credibility (Barton 2002, 304; Budiman 2001, 149).
The second scandal was known as “Bruneigate.” In late February 2000, Wahid was said to have
received a personal donation of $2 million (US) from the Sultan of Brunei to be spent on
humanitarian projects in Aceh, which he failed to report to the state treasury (Barton 2002, 304305; Budiman 2001, 149).
The upsurge of these scandals provided the opportunity to the Legislature to create the
Special Committee (Panitia Khusus, Pansus) to investigate the involvement of Wahid. In January
2001, the Special Committee’s investigation concluded that the allegation of Wahid’s
involvement in the Buloggate case resulted in the issuance of Memorandum I and II, which
demanded Wahid to respond to them (Haramain 2004, 273-274). Parliament accused Wahid of
failing to prevent corruption as mandated by the Assembly’s 1999 decision. The president’s
overlooking the memoranda eventually led Parliament to send a request to the Assembly to
arrange a Special Session (Ambardi 2008, 190).
Following the Legislature’s conclusion on Wahid’s involvement in the Buloggate
scandal, mass mobilization in the streets of the capital started and continued to occur frequently,
resulting in political instability (Woodward 2002). In January 2001, a number of students from
several universities in Jakarta, Bandung, and Bogor began storming the Legislature/Assembly
building, in Senayan, Jakarta, to protest Wahid’s administration (Tempo Interaktif, January 17,
2001). As reported by the media, a member of the Assembly from the Reform Faction (PAN),
Fuad Bawazier, agreed to the demands of the students and promised to speed up the
implementation of the Assembly’s Special Session. Another Reform Faction member, Hatta
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Rajasa, responded to the student rallies at Senayan as an expression of their genuine aspirations
and hence demanded Wahid’s resignation. A member of Parliament from Golkar, Syamsul
Muarif, suggested that the students should come to the leaders of the Assembly, as the authority
to hold the Assembly’s Special Session was in their hands (Tempo Interaktif, March 13, 2001).
Smaller student strikes occurred in some places outside Jakarta. In Lampung, around one
thousand students rallied demanding Wahid to step down (Tempo Interaktif, March 12, 2001).
Other protests occurred in Semarang, Central Java, which were carried out by some student
associations. The students called for a national strike to demand Wahid to resign from office.
They argued that Wahid did not take the Reform agenda seriously, especially in maintaining the
supremacy of law (Tempo Interaktif, March 12, 2001). Similar student protests also happened in
Makassar, South Sulawesi (Tempo Interaktif, March 15, 2001). In addition, the Association of
Muslim Students (Himpunan Muslim Indonesia, HMI) took part in the rallies demanding Wahid
to step down. The chairman of Golkar, Akbar Tanjung, and some other Golkar Party members
were part of an influential alumni network of HMI (Manan 2005, 186).
In general, as illustrated by Table 4, the demonstrations were carried out by student
organizations and did not involve cross-cleavage mobilization. Such a depiction reflects the low
embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict during Wahid’s presidency. Cross-cleavage
political mobilization did not really happen during the political crisis. The mass mobilization that
opposed Wahid mainly composed of Student Executive Body (BEM) executives from a number
of universities, especially in Jakarta and surrounding areas. Additionally, the mass mobilization
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only took place in several big cities of Indonesia, which predominantly occurred in the streets of
the capital.

Table 4. Anti-Wahid Mass Mobilization During January – May 2001

Date

Location

January 17, 2001

Senayan, Jakarta

January 31, 2001

Senayan, Jakarta

March 9, 2001

Senayan, Jakarta

March 12, 2001

Presidential Palace;
Senayan, Jakarta

March 12, 2001

Semarang

March 12, 2001

Lampung

March 15, 2001

Makassar

May 22, 2001

Presidential Palace,
Jakarta

Coalition
Student Executive Board
(BEM) of UI, Muhammadiyah
University of Jakarta, STIE
Rawamangun, Jakarta State
University, ITB, and IPB
BEM UI, ITB, and UIN
Jakarta
the United Action of Muslim
Students (KAMMI)
BEM UI, IPB, ITB, and
Usakti; Eggie Sudjana, Sri
Bintang Pamungkas, Amien
Rais; Fraksi Reformasi Fuad
Bawazier and Hatta Rajasa;
Fraksi Golkar Syamsul Muarif
BEM Diponegoro University
Lampung Student Network
(JML), the Society of Reform
Supporters, Young Muslim
Generation, BEM; Fraksi
Amanat Bintang Keadilan
Mudzakir Noor, Fraksi PDIP
Firmansyah.
the United Action of Muslim
Students (KAMMI)
the Indonesian Formal
Students Institution Alliance
(Alfonso)

Mass Estimation

Thousands

Thousands
Hundreds

Thousands

Hundreds

Hundreds

Hundreds
Thousands
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To counter the student strikes that demanded Wahid to step down, Wahid’s supporters
rallied in Jakarta and some cities in Java. They consisted of mainly Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
supporters and its organization affiliations (Tempo Interaktif, March 15, 2001). Some student
organizations that have affiliation with NU, such as the Indonesian Islamic Students Movement
(PMII), took part in the rallies to support Wahid. In addition, a small number of leftist student
organizations, such as the City Forum (Forkot), the Students Action for Democracy Forum
(Famred), and the National Students League for Democracy (LMND), supported Wahid to
continue his presidency and strongly encouraged Wahid to dismiss the Golkar Party as they
considered it the descendant of the New Order’s regime (Manan 2005, 186).
The demonstrations to support Wahid took place mainly in several cities in East Java, a
key base of NU supporters, including Surabaya, Pasuruan, Bangil, Situbondo, Malang,
Mojokerto, Probolinggo, Sidoarjo, and Banyuwangi. A similar rally also took place in Semarang,
the capital of Central Java, carried out by NU supporters. They argued that the proponents of the
New Order regime were the masterminds behind the move to topple Wahid (The Jakarta Post,
February 5, 2001).
Nearing the end of his presidency, Wahid and his party lost all the supporters that he
gained in the beginning of his term. His former political supporters separated themselves from a
coalition with Wahid and turned on him to become his main enemies: Central Axis, Golkar, and
his Vice President, along with the PDIP. Wahid ignored the fact that he had only small core
supporters in parliament and acted more as an elected president than as leader of the coalition
that had placed him in power. In short, he failed to establish the cooperative foundations of
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government and misread the rights of his office in the transitional period (Horowitz 2013, 103104). According to Mietzner, he even “regularly confronted his critics with authoritarian threats
and saw nothing wrong with channeling state resources to his clientele” (Mietzner 2009, 224).
The military leaders that should have been under his power eventually demonstrated their
disobedience. The military faction in the parliament joined the opponent bloc against Wahid’s
party, PKB. When the Assembly finally decided to assemble a Special Session, the military
factions supported such a decision (Haramain 2004). The Assembly’s Special Session called him
to hear an accountability speech. Consequently, if his accountability speech was finally rejected,
the president would be removed, and the vice president would finish the rest of his term. Wahid
tried to stop the proceeding by issuing emergency decrees and dissolving parliament (Horowitz
2013, 105). However, the military officers and the chief of police refused to carry out Wahid’s
decree. By violating the constitution himself, the police and the armed forces had strong
arguments to disobey Wahid’s instructions and ignored his authority (Mietzner 2009, 222-224).
With Wahid absent, the Assembly’s Special Session began, which resulted in a decision to
discharge the president. Following the dismissal of Wahid in July 2001, the Assembly elevated
Vice-President Megawati Soekarnoputri to the presidency (Horowitz 2013, 105).
In all, the rise of mass movements that began in January 2001 reflected the elite conflicts
between Wahid and the Legislature/Assembly. The mass mobilization, which had polarized into
the opponents and supporters of Wahid’s presidency, formed only a limited coalition of political
mobilization. The two sides of the coalition did not reach a mobilization with a large scale of
outreach, in which the mass mobilization only took place in several big cities in Indonesia,
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especially in Jakarta and surrounding areas. In fact, the political disagreements between Wahid
and the Legislature/Assembly triggered the Assembly to organize a special meeting resulting in
the removal of President Wahid from office in July 2001. However, such a situation did not
trigger the military takeover so thus the democracy has survived.
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CONCLUSION
This paper questions why elite conflicts in new democratic countries produce divergent
political outcomes and under what conditions elite conflicts lead to the breakdown of democracy.
While most literature on democratization overlooked popular mobilization to understand
democratic breakdown, I propose the interaction of two variables: elite conflict and mass
mobilization. I argue elite conflict during political crisis in the period of democratic transition
will result in the breakdown of a democratic regime as long as the embeddedness of mass
mobilization in elite conflict is high.
Egypt is a case of a high level embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict during
political crisis. In this case, a high level of embeddedness of mass mobilization in the elite
conflict triggered the military’s decision to take over. As a result, the Egyptian democracy broke
down. Cross-cleavage mobilization and massive- scale mobilization took place during the
political crisis of Morsi’s presidency, provided a chance for the military to intervene in civilian
politics, and caused the breakdown of Egyptian democracy.
Indonesia is a case of a low-level embeddedness of mass mobilization in elite conflict
during political crisis. Since mass mobilization was low, the elite conflict did not trigger the
military’s intervention. Thus, elite conflict with low embeddedness of mass mobilization was not
causing the democratic breakdown. Mass mobilization in elite conflict during Wahid’s
presidency formed only a limited coalition of political mobilization and did not reach large
outreach mobilization. Such a situation did not trigger a military takeover, thus the democracy
has survived.
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Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from this exploratory study could benefit by further
testing, using a wider array of cases. Its external validity needs to be extended by including more
cases. The breakdown and the survival of democratic regimes in the period of democratic
transition occurred in regions such as Latin America and Africa. Consequently, comparative
studies across region will be necessary and meaningful to gain a more complete understanding of
different regime outcomes during the democratic transition. In addition, large-N research may be
beneficial in order to further test and generalize the findings of this study.
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